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Scholars have puzzled over the fact that Plato’s criticisms of poetry are themselves 
contained in mimetic works. This paper sheds light on that phenomenon by examining 
an analogous one. The Symposium contains one fable (told by Aristophanes) which is 
criticised by means of another (told by Diotima) which is thought to represent Plato’s 
own view. Diotima’s fable, however, is suspended within a larger narrative that invites us 
to examine and question it. The Symposium thus affords opportunity to observe Plato’s 
criticisms of a genre and the qualifications that must be made regarding his own use 
of it. In particular, the Symposium emphasises that stories have no automatic claim to 
authority, whether they are told by a poet, or a priest or a philosopher. The upshot for 
Plato’s dialogues is that they remain always a starting point for philosophy: they are 
neither specimens of philosophical poetry nor philosophy per se.
I. Greek Fables and Their Significance for Plato
Fables belonged to Greek cultural heritage from pre-literate times. As Plato informs 
us, they were told by mothers and nurses as part of traditional upbringing (Republic 
377a). From about the sixth century BCE, fables entered the canon of Greek litera-
ture, where they were associated with the legendary figure of Aesop. These Aesopic 
“conventional” fables, which were restricted to simple language, quotidian elements, 
and a straightforward moral, belonged to the genre of mimetic prose, considered 
stylistically by ancient critics to have been a low artform (Kurke, 2006:8; Rothwell, 
1995:236). Nevertheless, the sort of muthoi on which they were based had already 
been elevated to poetic status in Homer (Odyssey 14.457–522) and Hesiod (Works 
and Days 202–211), and fable-telling found its way into the works of Aristophanes 
(Wasps, Frogs) and Sophocles (Ajax 1142–62). According to Plato, Socrates himself 
was busy setting Aesop’s fables to verse in his last days (Phaedo 60c). Thus, we may 
say that fables belonged to Greek poetics in general, at least insofar as their content 
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is concerned. That Plato treated them so is clear from the fact that he bundles fables 
and poetry together in his criticism of poetry in Republic II.
Fables also had an important didactic function in Greek society. They served as 
preliminary to education in poetry, in which teachers would set before their students 
“stories praising and extolling the good men of yore” (Plato, Protagoras 326a1–4).1 
We know, too, that from at least the fifth century BCE, fables continued to be used 
in education well after students had learned their letters. Within the sophistic move-
ment, thinkers like Protagoras, Prodicus and Antiphon all used fables to adumbrate 
philosophical lessons (Kurke, 2011: chapter 8). Often these “sophistic” fables were 
stylistically and thematically complex, and provided opportunity for philosophical 
reflection. Plato’s dialogues contain examples of teachers using fables to adumbrate 
a philosophical point (Protagoras 320c–328d, Symposium 203b–212c, Statesman 
268d–275d), and some scholars have argued that when Plato’s Socrates presents fables 
(for example at Phaedo 60c), he does so with the same purpose.2
Given the way that Socrates and others within the frame of Plato’s dialogues use 
narrative, it is worth remembering that Plato’s dialogues were themselves species of 
mimetic prose (a point recognised by Aristotle, Poetics 1447b9–13, and emphasised by 
Kurke, 2006:7–12). It is plausible that the didactic function of mimetic prose remained 
important to Plato throughout his career. In that case, the more we know of Plato’s 
views about fables, both in their conventional and later sophistic uses, the better we 
can understand his adaptation of mimetic prose to his own philosophy.
There is no place in the dialogues where Plato presents a theory about the proper 
construction and purpose of fables, but there is an excellent opportunity to glimpse 
his view. The Symposium presents both a “conventional” fable (Aristophanes’ fable of 
the circle-men, 182c–192e) and a “sophistic” fable (Diotima’s fable about the birth of 
Love, 202e–204c). Aristophanes’ fable is more or less self-contained, and the lesson 
we should draw from it is obvious. Diotima’s fable is enigmatic, hence it requires exe-
gesis. This is recounted by Socrates in a synopsis of what Diotima taught him over the 
course of many lessons (201d, 206b, 207a, 212b). In a striking anachronism, Diotima’s 
exegesis explicitly refers to the views contained in Aristophanes’ fable (205d–206a; 
cf. 212c). In fact, it appears that Diotima’s fable is “intended to counter and trump 
Aristophanes’ fable point by point” (Kurke, 2011:308). Thus by examining the two 
fables together we can see an implicit criticism of one in terms of the other.
But that is not the end of the story. There is a third fable in the Symposium, whose 
character as fable has gone unnoticed by commentators. That is the story that Socrates 
tells about Diotima and his lessons with her once upon a time. Although she is 
presented in a realistic way, Diotima appears to be an invented character.3 She is 
1 All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are my own.
2 See Gabor Betegh’s account of Socrates’ fable about Pleasure and Pain in Phaedo 60c (Betegh, 2009), 
and G. R. F. Ferrari’s account of the fable of the cicadas in Phaedrus 259b–d (Ferrari, 1987).
3 Dover’s suspicion is palpable: “We do not know whether Diotima is real or fictitious and it does not 
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completely unknown to history, despite Socrates’ claim that she brought about a ten 
year postponement of plague at Athens (201d3–5), and despite the notoriety that we 
would expect to accompany a female “itinerant charismatic” (Burkert, 1987:43) who 
taught erotics professionally at Athens in the fifth century.4 Moreover, even if Diotima 
was a real person, the speeches that Socrates puts into her mouth are invented. As if by 
magic, they refer to one after another of the symposiasts’ views.5 She refers specifically 
to Aristophanes’ view that lovers are people who are looking for their other halves 
(205d–e). And in the heart of her revelations about love she professes a metaphysical 
doctrine so reminiscent of the Platonic theory of forms that it cannot credibly be 
assigned to any earlier philosopher. Diotima, as she appears in the Symposium, is a 
creature of fantasy; the story Socrates tells about her, however true or false its content 
might be, is a fabrication.
Accordingly, we should take special note of the remarks Socrates makes at the 
conclusion of his speech. There he says, not that he mastered Diotima’s teachings, but 
that he was “persuaded” (pepeismai) by them (212b1–2), and immediately adds that, 
being persuaded, he tries to persuade others that Love will enable, encourage and 
help them to attain virtue (212b2–9). This sort of pragmatic coda is typical of those 
offered by Socrates after presenting a muthos,6 and strongly suggests we should regard 
the whole passage (201b–212c) as a story whose function in the dialogue requires 
interpretation. In particular, we must wonder about the implications of a story in 
which the main character uses a story to criticise another story.7
In what follows I discuss the three fables in the Symposium, with a view towards 
understanding what they show us about Plato’s views on narrative in general, and what 
the implications of those views are for how to read the dialogues. To avoid ambiguity, 
much matter, considering the extreme improbability that even if she really existed she entertained the 
Platonic theory of ideas in any form” (1980:137). Dover then provides an explanation for the construc-
tion of Diotima’s character and name on the assumption that she is fictitious. In a recent paper, Nancy 
Evans associates Diotima with Demeter and suggests that the name “Diotima” is “not without heavy 
irony for Plato’s original audience” (Evans, 2006:8).
4 Erotics is explicitly identified as the subject matter of Diotima’s teaching at 201d5 (kai eme ta erōtika 
edidaxen), and the label is oft-repeated in Socrates’ speech (207c3, 207c6, 209e5, 210e2, 211c1, 212b6). 
The suggestion that Diotima provided professional education in erotics is supported by her remark 
about Socrates becoming “frightfully clever” (deinos, 207c3; cf. 193e5) as a result of her teaching, and 
by Socrates’ explicit comparison of Diotima to a sophist at 208c1. For the notoriety that such teaching 
would attract at Athens, compare the story of Theodote in Xenophon, Memorabilia III.11.
5 Her references to Alcestis and Achilles (208d) recall the speech of Phaedrus (179–180). Her descrip-
tion of the dual nature of Eros (204b) recalls Pausanius’ account of the two Aphrodites (180d–e). Her 
comprehensive treatment of all the phenomena of love under “poetics”, is reminiscent of Eryximachus’ 
treatment of all the phenomena of love under the art of medicine. Her fable about the birth of Eros 
responds to Aristophanes’ fable. And it “just so happens” that Socrates had been talking to Diotima 
about exactly the things he was talking to Agathon about (201e4). For a review of the way that Diotima’s 
teachings systematically take up the views of the symposiasts, see Markus, 1971.
6 See Gorgias 526d, Meno 81d (cf. 86b), Phaedo 114d, Republic 621b.
7 Whether Diotima “speaks for Plato” (White, 2004:366n2) or not (Osborne, 1994:56–57) is not the issue. 
The issue is what is expected of a reader upon encountering these assertions in a fabricated story.
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I distinguish between “Diotima’s fable” and “the fable of Diotima” in the following 
way: when considering what Diotima says, within the frame of her discourse, I will 
speak of “Diotima’s fable”; when considering, at one remove, Socrates’ narration of 
his encounter with Diotima, I use the term “fable of Diotima”.
The fable of Diotima has similarities to both Aristophanes’ fable and Diotima’s 
fable. Like Aristophanes’ fable it is self-contained. Socrates does not tell us how to read 
it. But like Diotima’s fable the moral of the story is not obvious. The most important 
implication this has for us is that we must examine it. The philosophical work is left 
for us, and that reminds us that we must examine all the speeches in the Symposium. 
This is a point the other symposiasts, and many readers of the Symposium fail to 
appreciate. Although the symposiasts are not impartial to the speeches, they remain 
indifferent to the truth (Symposium 198e; cf. Wohlmann 1992:19). Socrates’ fable of 
Diotima reminds us that we cannot remain indifferent to truth even when the story is 
presented with a claim to authority, such as divine inspiration or technical expertise. 
But we are getting ahead of ourselves. Let us examine Aristophanes’ fable first.
II. Aristophanes’ Fable, Symposium 189c–192e
Aristophanes tells a tale so simple and attractive that it has appeared to many as the 
most persuasive view in the Symposium.8 Yet if we focus only on the basic plot of 
lovers’ search for their “other halves”, we will miss much of Plato’s criticism of the 
conventional fable. As with most conventional fables, the plot is an ancient one (a point 
Plato makes clear by reference to the old lovers’ folly of using of tallies to “recognise” 
each other, 191d3–5). What matters more is how the story is told, by whom, and for 
what reason. But let us first remind ourselves of the details.
According to Aristophanes, human beings were once very different than they are 
now. They were double-beings, with two faces, four arms, and four legs. There were 
three varieties: double-male, double-female, and hermaphrodite. As they were twice 
the size of modern humans, they were quicker and more powerful. They could move 
about with ease simply by extending their arms and legs and rolling “like acrobats 
turning cartwheels” (190a6). But they had “big ideas” (190b6), and in their arrogance 
they set upon the gods.
In order to save them from themselves, Zeus cut them in half — “just as people 
chop sorb-apples when they are going to preserve them, or just as they slice eggs with 
a hair” (190d7–e2) — thereby achieving the double purpose of weakening them and 
making them more numerous (so there would be more sacrifices). He bid Apollo to 
turn their heads around, so that seeing their wounds they might become more orderly. 
And then he asked Apollo to close up the incisions, which he did by pulling the skin 
8 See Nussbaum (1986:171–175), Nozick (1989:68–86, esp. 76, 81), Solomon (1981:110, 111, 118, 144, 
271, 275). Some thinkers, including Freud and Jung thought that Aristophanes’ story “represented 
Plato’s own view of love” (Allen, 1991:31–32, with references 32n53).
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over the wounds and drawing it together “like a draw-string bag” (190e7–8) at the 
navel. After that, humans walked on two legs, as they do now. And Zeus warned that 
if they continued in wantonness, he would split them again.
As a consequence of the division, each of the two-legged beings yearned for its other 
half. But because they could not achieve union, they simply embraced one another 
and would not let go. And so they were dying. Zeus took pity on them and moved 
their genitals to the front, so that “if a man happened upon a woman, they would 
copulate and reproduce, whereas if a man happened upon another man, he might at 
least get fulfilment from conjugation, take a rest, and return to business” (191c6–7).
Thus, each of us is just a “tally” (191d4) of a whole person, always seeking the one 
who tallies with us. Whenever two people meet their other half they do not want to 
be separated for a moment. They “cannot say” (192c3, d1) what they want from one 
another; they only divine it darkly and refer to it in riddles. Nevertheless, our original 
nature is responsible for the desire to be whole. So we must always be mindful of the 
“original sin” (tēn adikian, 193a2), and fear the gods, lest we be split again. Aristo-
phanes closes his remarkable speech with an important concession. It is difficult to 
find the perfect match. As things stand now, we should aim for the next best thing, 
which is simply to find someone with a nature congenial to our own (193c5–8).
Dover long ago observed (1980:113), that Aristophanes’ story has all the elements 
of a conventional fable. Recently, Leslie Kurke has shown this in much greater detail 
(2011:310–312). She points out that the style of Aristophanes’ fable is simple, linear, 
and artless, and the content “teems with common, quotidian stuff in vivid images 
drawn from everyday life” (2011:310). Thus, we have the cartwheels, the sorb-apples 
and the boiled eggs, the draw-string bags, the tallies, and so on. It is important to 
note, however, the special use of the conventional fable by a comic poet. In fact, Plato 
goes out of his way to emphasise this point, by having Aristophanes acknowledge 
his muse (189b7) at the start of his speech.9 Whereas conventional fables expressed 
the tacitly subversive perspective of the lower classes (Rothwell, 1995:234–5), Aris-
tophanes’ fable reinforces the overall conservative message of Old Comedy. Thus, it 
stresses the consequences of hubris, the virtue of simple piety, and the conventional 
moral order of gods and men.
Aristophanes’ fable goes a step further by laying the blame for our condition at 
the door of human ingenuity. It was “big ideas” (phronēmata megala, 190b6) that 
brought about our downfall. Apart from this single instance, Aristophanes locates 
all deliberation and planning with the gods. By contrast the ordinary activities of the 
circle-men are mindless and purposeless: they go about turning cartwheels like circus 
performers. Once filleted, the appropriate activities of humans include sacrificing, 
9 Kurke (2011:311–312) thinks that Aristophanes explicitly distinguishes his speech from Comedy (cf. 
mē ... kōmōidōn, 193b6; mē kōmōidēsēis, 193d6–7), but surely his usage is “disingenuous”, as Kurke 
herself admits (2011:311). Dover (1980:120) correctly sees Aristophanes’ point as distinguishing 
between saying something ridiculous, and saying something funny but serious. The latter is expected 
from Old Comedy.
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copulating, and working — not thinking. The responsibility for their preservation 
belongs with Zeus, not with them.
Thus, there is a gulf between gods and mortals that must at all times be respected. 
Rationality lies on the gods’ side of the divide, as even Aristophanes’ account of love 
shows. On his view, love is an irrational longing for a particular “other half ”. It is irra-
tional in two ways. First, it cannot be attained. Zeus’ cut is final. Even the circle-men 
cannot be put back together; they enjoy at best the temporary satisfaction of coitus. 
Second, the search is impossible. The idea of restoration may have made some sense 
for the circle-men, but it makes no sense for the generations of humans who came 
after. There literally is no particular other half of them. They simply imprint on a 
particular other, who, if they are lucky, is “the next best thing” (193c7) and “congenial 
to [their] nature” (193c8). Plato foregrounds the irrationality of love in Aristophanes’ 
fable by making lovers unable to say what they want from each other (192c3, d1). 
Their longing is a riddle without resolution.
The consequences of Aristophanes’ fable for reason are targeted by Diotima, who 
introduces a new class of beings, daimones, to fill the gaps between humans and gods. 
On her account, Love is one of these beings, who stands midway between ignorance 
and wisdom: “for wisdom pertains to the most beautiful things, and Love is love of 
the beautiful; therefore Love is a lover of wisdom, and love of wisdom lies halfway 
between wisdom and ignorance” (204b2–5). This syllogism, which identifies wisdom 
as the object of Love, allows Diotima to underscore the importance of reason to human 
beings. But all is not what it seems in the speech of Diotima, and to see that, we must 
now examine her discourse in more detail.
III. Diotima’s Fable, Symposium 202e–204c
We saw that Aristophanes’ fable is conventional in its form and conservative in its 
message. We shall now consider specifically how Diotima’s fable responds to it. It is 
important to foreshadow, however, that the speech within which Diotima’s fable is 
contained — Socrates’ speech — is presented in response to Agathon. In the next sec-
tion we will see how Socrates’ fable of Diotima achieves this response, and how this 
matters for our interpretation of the Symposium. But for the moment let us remain 
within the frame and remind ourselves what Diotima says about Love.
She begins by describing the daimones. They are intermediate between men and 
gods, and “being in the midst of both, they suffuse the space completely, so that the 
whole is bound together, itself to itself ” (202e6–7). When Diotima says that Love 
is one of the daimones, Socrates asks who his parents were.10 “That’s rather long to 
set out in detail,” she says (203b1), but she tells him anyway. It happens that when 
10 This is probably an intentional allusion to the issue about the parentage of Love raised by Phaedrus 
(178a) and then contradicted implicitly by Pausanias (180d) and directly by Agathon (195b). Once 
again, it highlights the artificiality of Socrates’ whole story.
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
THE MORAL OF THE STORY: ON FABLES AND PHILOSOPHY IN PLATO’S SYMPOSIUM
7
Aphrodite was born and the gods were feasting, Need came begging at the door. 
Meanwhile, Resource, who was drunk from nectar, had fallen asleep in the garden, 
and Need, considering her own resourcelessness, devised a scheme to get a child by 
him. So she lay with him and conceived Love. Thus Love, who was begotten on the 
day of Aphrodite’s birth, attends Aphrodite, and “by nature loves the beautiful, since 
Aphrodite is beautiful” (203c3–4).
Love in Diotima’s fable is a sort of half-breed, possessing some of the traits of his 
father and suffering some of the fate of his mother. As a child of Need, he is “always 
needy” (203c6). He lacks beauty and delicacy; rather he is “hard, withered, barefoot 
and homeless, always sleeping on the ground beneath the stars, in doorways or in the 
streets” (203c7–d2). Then again, he has his father’s cunning for [obtaining] beautiful 
and good things; he is “brave, bold, eager, and full of schemes; a mighty (deinos) 
hunter, both craving and capable of ingenuity, a lover of wisdom throughout life, a 
fearsome (deinos) wizard, sorcerer and sophist” (203d4–8). Love is neither mortal 
nor immortal, he is never completely at a loss or completely satisfied, he is “midway” 
(203e5) between wisdom and ignorance.
We can already see some striking differences between Diotima’s fable and Aristo-
phanes’. Aristophanes’ world is one of persistent division. There is the division between 
gods and men, which cuts the whole world in half. Then there are pervasive images 
of division: half-men and women, chopped sorb-apples, sliced eggs, broken tallies, 
halved flatfish, profile bas-relief images, and so on. The isolated half (indicated by the 
term hemisu), is fundamental in Aristophanes’ story.11 By contrast, Diotima’s story 
emphasises persistent connection. The concept of an intermediate (indicated by the 
term metaxu) provides for connection between complementary opposites.12 The dai-
mones, including Love, are such intermediates. As if to emphasise the contrast with 
Aristophanes, Diotima says that intermediates are “half-way between” the extremes (en 
mesōi, 202e6, 204e5). Whereas Aristophanes’ fable merely dreams of reunification, that 
goal is already realised in Diotima’s metaphysics.13 Thus, it is difficult to see Diotima’s 
claim that “the whole is bound together, itself to itself ” (202e6–7) as anything but a 
response to Aristophanes’ fancy that Hephaestus could (but doesn’t) weld two lovers 
together for all time (192d–e).
There is also an obvious difference between the way the two fables handle thinking. 
Whereas Aristophanes placed thinking on the side of the gods, and scorned humans 
for having big ideas, Diotima goes out of her way to emphasise that the gods simply 
are wise (204a), while planning, scheming, thinking, and philosophising belong to 
11 See 190e3, 191a6, 191b2, 191b4, 192b6.
12 In the build-up to her story Diotima uses metaxu five times: 202a3, 202a9, 202b5, 202d11, 202e1. She 
then returns to it at 204b1, 204b5.
13 This contrast is marked by the use of optative, subjunctive and future conditionals in Aristophanes’ 
speech (192d–e,193d; all expressing unreality) and by the perfect infinitive sundedesthai in Diotima’s 
speech (203e7; expressing a present state — the “bound-together” nature of the whole — resulting from 
completed action).
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Love (203d). It is in connection with this difference that the most explicit contrast 
between the two fables is drawn. For planning is impossible without a goal, and 
Aristophanes’ lovers cannot say what they want. By contrast Love, in Diotima’s fable, 
seeks beauty, wisdom and goodness (203c4, 203d4–5, 204b2–5). Thus, Diotima can 
say in closing her story: “Some tell a tale that lovers are seeking their own half. But my 
story says that a lover [seeks] neither half nor whole unless in some way it happens 
to be good” (205d10–e3).
There appears ample evidence, then, for treating Diotima’s fable as a response to 
Aristophanes. But what are we to make of that? Is Diotima’s fable just Plato’s correction 
of an Aristophanic hypothesis? To see why we should not make that inference, we 
need to consider the literary dimension of Diotima’s fable. Leslie Kurke has made a 
careful study of the style and development of Diotima’s speech (2011:310–322). She 
concludes that Diotima’s fable belongs to the genre of “Sophistic fables” along with 
Prodicus’ Choice of Heracles, Antiphon’s On Concord, and the fable told by Protagoras 
in Plato’s Protagoras. She notes that all of these have a polished, rhetorical style, borrow 
vocabulary from technical or poetic sources, have complex sentence structures and 
carefully balanced clauses, and make abundant explanatory claims. In all of these ways, 
Diotima’s fable is like a Sophistic fable, and unlike the humbler Aristophanic one.
There is further evidence in the way Diotima’s fable develops. Whereas conven-
tional fables were entirely self-contained, many Sophists deployed fables in a larger 
educational context, placing them at the beginning of a display piece which then devel-
oped and explained the ideas and implications of the fable in a makrologia or “long 
speech”. Diotima’s fable is like this too: it is, she says, “rather long to set out in detail” 
(makroteron ... diēgēsasthai, 203b1). The “detail” can hardly refer just to the story of 
Love’s birth, which is only eleven lines; it must include the whole exegesis that follows.
Finally there is evidence, which Plato carefully placed in the text, that Diotima 
was a sophist herself. Even when introducing her, Socrates calls her “wise in matters 
of love and many other things” (201d3), a remark that recalls the polymathic wis-
dom of sophists. She is a foreigner (201d2, e3), a teacher (201d5; 207a5, c6) and a 
technician. Like the daimones she later describes, she possesses “the art (technē) of 
divination, the priestly arts, and those concerning sacrifices, incantations, oracles 
and sorcery” (202e8–203a1). Through such skill she managed to suspend the onset of 
plague at Athens for ten years (201d3–5), for “the one who is wise about such things 
is divine (daimonios) with a wisdom superior to that of the manual and banausic arts” 
(203a4–6). Such a person would be, like Resource in Diotima’s own fable, “a fearsome 
(deinos) wizard, sorcerer and sophist” (203d4–8).14
Given all this, it should come as no surprise, and need no explanation, that Socrates 
says Diotima answered him “just like a consummate sophist” (208c1). What needs 
explanation is Plato’s motive in presenting a sophistic fable, in a sophistic manner, in 
14 Note the similar terminology in each context — goēteian, 203a1 and goēs, 203d8 — and cf. Dover 
(1980:140).
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what is usually taken to be the philosophical core of the dialogue. That explanation 
is forthcoming only when we examine the function of Socrates’ whole speech, which 
includes his fable of Diotima.
IV. Socrates’ Speech, Including the Fable of Diotima. 
Symposium 198b–212c
The beginning of our explanation lies, not with Aristophanes, but with Agathon. 
Agathon had praised Love as the youngest, loveliest, daintiest, softest, most temperate, 
most manly, most just, wisest, most creative and best of all the gods (195b–197e). 
This speech, which bristles with superlatives and is supported by the flimsiest of 
justifications, has been judged by most commentators to be vacuous.15 Within the 
dialogue, Socrates certainly takes it that way. He praises it, ironically, as “comprehen-
sively beautiful” (198b3), but he singles out “the beauty of diction” (198b4–5), which 
reminded him so much of the rhetorician Gorgias that he feared Agathon would 
“send the terrifying Gorgian head” (198c3–4) upon him and strike him stone dumb. 
He then rebukes Agathon (and all the symposiasts) for showing no concern for truth, 
concluding, “I won’t praise [Love] in this way, for I wouldn’t be able, but all the same 
I want to tell the truth [about Love] in my own way, not yours” (199a7–b2).
Socrates’ claim that he “wouldn’t be able” to praise Love as the others have is ironic. 
As in other dialogues, he gives a speech that is rhetorically superior to Agathon’s in 
every way.16 What is more, he presents it in a way that is recognisably rhetorical, 
since Diotima’s fable and its subsequent exegesis adopt the genre of sophistic fable. In 
fact, Socrates is able to escape the charge of contradicting himself about how he will 
speak only by the rhetorical device of putting his speech in the mouth of someone 
else — the sophist Diotima.
Plato adds a flourish of his own to Socrates’ rhetorical tour de force. After Socrates 
finishes speaking, Alcibiades arrives, and crowns Agathon’s head with ribbons. When 
he notices Socrates, he says to Agathon, “return [some] of the ribbons, that I might 
crown the [head] of this [sc. Socrates] with them, the wondrous head” (213e1–2). I 
translate these lines quite literally, to show how Plato put the phrase tēn thaumastēn 
kephalēn (“the wondrous head”) in emphatic position, at the end of the clause. More-
over (and what is not seen in most translations), by moving the phrase to the end, it 
becomes the grammatical subject of the verb memphētai in the next line: “... and [so 
15 See Belfiore (2011:164–5), Dover (1980:123), Emlyn-Jones (2004:395), Markus (1971:135), Nichols 
(2004:191–2).
16 For another instance where Socrates’ feigns incapability, only to surpass expectation see Protagoras 
334c, followed by Socrates’ long speech from 342a–347a. For an occasion on which Socrates makes 
highly rhetorical speeches in competition with a previous speech see Phaedrus 237a ff., 243a ff. For an 
occasion on which Socrates claims he will not speak in rhetorical fashion but then does, see Apol. 17b 
followed by the sublime speeches in his defense. That Socrates is capable of speaking at length in highly 
rhetorical fashion see Ion 533c ff., Gorgias 523a ff.
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that] it [sc. the wondrous head] does not blame me that I crowned you” (kai [hina] 
mē moi memphētai hoti se men anedēsa, 213e3). This image of a talking head is surely 
meant to recall the “Gorgian” head of Agathon, which Socrates feared might strike him 
dumb. Yet by his own admission Agathon never inhibited anyone, not even his slaves 
(175b6–7), while Socrates, as Alcibiades says, “with mere words” (215c7) “strikes us 
dumb and binds us fast” (215d5–6).
It makes sense to treat these remarks of Alcibiades’ as, among other things, a 
warning not to be struck dumb by the wondrous head of Socrates. When we look at 
Socrates’ speech, we can see it as two responses in one. One response is contained in 
Diotima’s fable. By specifically challenging and undermining the content of Aristo-
phanes’ fable, Diotima engages in a contest of one-upmanship. Furthermore, by pre-
senting her own fable in a distinctively fifth century form, Diotima usurps the older 
conventional fable genre. In these ways Diotima’s fable is seen to “trump” Aristophanes’ 
(though whether it ultimately “wins” is another question, cf. 212c). A second response 
is contained in Socrates’ fable of Diotima. This masterful display of rhetoric, which 
disguises itself as something other than rhetoric, is a response to Agathon. Like the 
response to Aristophanes, it pays Agathon back in kind. It trumps Agathon’s speech 
to such an extent that Alcibiades removes some of the ribbons he placed on Agathon’s 
head and replaces them on Socrates’, claiming “he [Socrates] is victorious in words 
over all mankind” (213e3–4).
It might be said, however, that whereas Agathon’s speech was vacuous, Socrates’ 
fable of Diotima is philosophically substantial. After all, it contains a theory about 
human motivation, a theology of gods, daimones, and mortals, and a metaphysics of 
transcendent reality. Closer inspection reveals, however, that “Diotima has not offered 
us good grounds for believing any of her psychological, religious and metaphysical 
assertions” (Dover, 1980:159). Indeed, there is considerable sleight of hand in her 
responses to the fundamental question, “What does Love want?”. At one point it is 
wisdom (204b), at another possession of the good (206a); then again it is procreation 
(206b), immortality (207a), or a vision of the beautiful itself (211d). Clearly these 
cannot all be interchangeable. If the fable of Diotima contains more assertions than 
Agathon’s speech does, it is no less dogmatic.
The difference is that the fable of Diotima is not presented dogmatically, as Aris-
tophanes’ fable and Diotima’s fable were. Aristophanes provided the moral of his 
story: fear the gods and hope that Love may help us. Diotima provided an exegesis 
to explain the moral of her story, but the exegesis, brilliant as it is, remains confusing 
and difficult to follow (206b, 207c). Only the most capable of imitates can understand 
it (209e, 210e). Although Socrates claims that he did understand — a claim which we 
shall presently expose as impossible to read — he never says he expected his fellow 
symposiasts, who are less capable and less keen than he is (cf. 204a3–4), to understand 
Diotima’s highest mysteries. He presented the fable of Diotima to persuade others that 
Love (i.e. philosophy) will enable, encourage and help them to attain virtue (212b2–9). 
This is Socrates’ familiar exhortation to practice philosophy.
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Philosophy is a practice hardly anyone at Agathon’s symposium engages in. Even 
Socrates hardly does so. He attends the dinner party having bathed and put on shoes, 
two things he rarely did (174a2–3). In doing so, he adopts an appearance unlike that of 
the philosopher — Love — who goes about barefoot and sleeps on the earth. For most 
of the night he retains that unphilosophical appearance. For two brief moments before 
his speech he slips back into typical philosophical mode. The first is at 194a–d, when 
he starts to question Agathon about how one should act in front of wise or ignorant 
people. On that occasion he is stopped by Phaedrus, who remarks that the questions 
will never end if they let Socrates continue. The second time is from 199c–201d, when 
Socrates briefly interrogates Agathon about his claim that Love is a beautiful god. That 
elenchus is cut short by Socrates himself, in order to present the fable of Diotima.
Socrates not only enforces a ban on his own philosophising, he enforces a ban 
on his usual profession of ignorance. Near the beginning of the dialogue he boldly 
asserts that he understands ta erōtika (177d7–8). Later, first Eryximachus and then 
Socrates repeat this claim (193e4–5, 198d1–3). Socrates then says that what Diotima 
taught him was ta erōtika (201d5), and Diotima refers to ta erōtika several times as 
the subject matter of Socrates’ lessons (207c3, 207c7, 209e5, 210e2, 211c1). Socrates 
concludes by saying that as a result of Diotima’s teaching, he honours ta erōtika above 
all things (212b6). The conclusion seems inescapable: Socrates has understood Dioti-
ma’s teachings, and beheld the beautiful itself.
Yet perhaps the taste of philosophy in Socrates’ two lapses is enough to make us 
pay attention to a contradiction in his account. Recall that Love, in Diotima’s fable, 
is a philosopher. He is a seeker of wisdom “throughout all of life” (203d7). Although 
he is cunning (203d4) and ingenious (203d6), he remains always in need (203c6) and 
never completely satisfied (203e4–5). The gods alone are wise; Love, being a daimon, is 
always between wisdom and ignorance. Humans, as inferior to daimones, must remain 
even further away from wisdom. If Socrates has really learned all there is to know about 
love from Diotima, then what he relates in the story must be true. But if the story is 
true, then neither he nor Diotima could understand the highest mysteries, since those 
truths lie beyond the capability of human beings. Socrates’ claim to understand ta 
erōtika is unproven; his evidence is self-falsifying. But why has he made such a point 
of asserting the claim in the first place?
V. The Moral of the Story
The answer has to do with the supposed authority of one who knows. Both Aristo-
phanes and Agathon repose in the traditional view that poetic authority results from 
the inspiration of a god or a Muse.17 On this view, poets are authoritative because 
17 Agathon explicitly refers to the divine inspiration of the poet (196d6–e6, cf. 197c3), while Aristophanes 
reminds his audience that being funny “comes with the territory of our Muse” (189b6–7). Both are 
responding to Eryximachus, who had appealed to the authority of his own technē, the art of medicine 
(186a–187a).
Archived at Flinders University: dspace.flinders.edu.au
RICK BENITEZ
12
they are “representatives of the gods” (cf. hoi de poiētai ouden all’ ē hermēnēs eisin 
tōn theōn, Ion 534e4–5). Socrates presents himself (superficially) as having a similar 
claim to authority: he has received instruction from Diotima, who was versed in the 
priestly arts through contact with daimones, who are representatives of the gods (cf. 
hermēneuon ... ta para theōn, Symposium 202e3–4). In fact, Socrates makes consid-
erable effort to present himself as superior to the poets on poetic terms. He addresses 
both Aristophanes and Agathon using literary forms familiar to them. He presents a 
fable (Diotima’s fable) that surpasses Aristophanes’ fable in form and content. And 
he presents another narrative (the fable of Diotima) which implies that Agathon’s 
skill with “words and phrases” (198b5) belongs to a narrow conception of poetry as 
“music and meter” (205c6).
In terms of his own story, Socrates appears to be a better kind of poet. For Diotima 
says that poetry in its widest sense includes “whatever is responsible for bringing any-
thing from not being to being” (205b8–c2), and Love — a wizened, homely, barefoot 
philosopher reminiscent of Socrates (203c7–d4, 204b4) — is characterised as a poet in 
this sense. He longs to “beget in the presence of the beautiful” (206b7–8), where “he 
will beget not semblances of virtue” (212a3–4) — which is what Socrates accused the 
other symposiasts of doing in their sort of eulogy — but genuine virtue, because he 
does not touch semblances but rather, truth. Thus, a philosopher who brings genuinely 
beautiful things into being would be a poet in the truest sense.
All this belongs to the tactic of undermining the authority of the other poets. But 
there is a twist, because Socrates’ own claim to authority is impossible. At one level, 
then, Socrates competes directly with Aristophanes and Agathon. He assumes the 
appearance of an authoritative poet in order to present the story of the only sort of 
poetry that could genuinely represent the beautiful. On closer inspection, however, 
his fable of Diotima turns out to be a beautiful lie. Thus, at another level, Socrates is 
not the enlightened philosopher-poet he appears to be. The vision of the beautiful 
itself exceeds even his capability. This sting in the tail has important consequences for 
the Symposium. It implies that no simple claim to authority is a sufficient guarantee 
of a story: not that of a comic poet, nor that of a tragic poet, nor that of a storytelling 
priestess, nor even that of a philosopher-poet. Fables are not to be believed simply 
because of their provenance. Even a fable plus exegesis is inadequate if the exegesis 
rests solely on the authority of the storyteller, as in Diotima’s fable. All stories and 
their explanations must be subjected to critical examination. In a statement that both 
reasserts and undermines his ambiguous position, Socrates says: “evidently it is the 
truth you are unable to refute ... [to refute] Socrates is nothing difficult” (201c8–9).
This final point appears to have wider implications. The Symposium shows us Pla-
to’s reservations about the uncritical reception of conventional fables. It also shows 
us, if we look carefully, his objections to the sophistic expansion of the fable genre: 
explaining what a story means is not equivalent to showing that it is true. Perhaps 
the lesson of the Symposium ends there, but the need to examine the claims of a story 
philosophically suggests a qualification to Plato’s own use of mimetic prose. It is not 
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just that we are intended to subject the fables in the Symposium to a critical exami-
nation, but that we are intended to examine the whole dialogue (which is a story told 
by Aristodemus to Apollodorus and then by Apollodorus to Glaucon), and indeed 
all the dialogues of Plato, with a view not towards their authority or provenance, but 
only towards truth. If refuting Socrates is nothing difficult, then surely it is something 
we should try to do. And if that is the moral of the story, then the dialogues are not 
presented as the doctrinal assertions of an accomplished sage, but as invitations to 
the practice of philosophy.
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